INTRODUCTION
In this article we focus on the intertemporal aspects of technological adoption. We consider a simplified model: firms produce an homogeneous good and adoption decisions concern a cost reducing technology. We focus on the issue of industrial leadership reversal.
Imagine an industry facing a sequence of cost reducing innovations; the appearance of newer generations of PC processors provides a good example of the sort of improvements we have in mind.
Individual firms can upgrade by adopting the most recent improvement. This improvement comes at a cost, for example, of installing the new processors. Will firms choose to make these costly adoptions? How do adoption rates depend on the product market competition? Which adoption patterns will be sustainable in equilibrium? Will these adoption strategies reduce aggressive competition?
We consider a duopoly where firms set prices; i.e., there is Bertrand competition in the product market. In an intertemporal, infinite horizon setting, firms can adopt alternative and complicated dynamic adoption strategies. We study Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) and in addition restrict attention to equilibria with relatively simple but economically relevant patterns. These are: (1) alternating adoptions and (2) increasing asymmetry. An increasing asymmetry pattern of adoptions is such that the firm with the lowest unit cost adopts, while the high cost firm does not, so that existing cost asymmetry is reinforced. An alternating adoptions pattern is such that the is the patent race (Lee and Wilde, 1980) . Players involved in the race have often distinct roles,4 an incumbent monopolist and a challenger, or two firms with different initial unit costs.
The conclusions about which equilibrium prevails in the incumbent/challenger case have been twofold: Gilbert and Newbery (1982) proved that the monopolist preempts the challenger and wins the patent because of the dissipation of industry profits associated with a less concentrated market structure. Reinganum (1983) shows that, when winning the race gives sufficiently high post innovation profits,5 the challenger is more likely to win because of the profit replacement effect.
A testable implication of Reinganum's result, similar to our conclusions, is that "challengers contribute disproportionately more large innovations." Considering a finite sequence of drastic innovations, Reinganum (1985) obtains an industry with turnover of technological leadership.
Analyzing a finite sequence of bidding games for nondrastic innovations Vickers (1986) shows that under Bertrand competition persistent dominance is the only possible equilibrium.
Fudenberg et al. (1983) studied a race made by a sequence of bids to obtain a patent. In their model the follower has a chance to leapfrog only if he can overtake the leader in one step, but there is a maximum level of cumulated asymmetry leading the follower to drop out of the contest, while Vickers (1985, 1987) , by assuming that the follower has to go through all the steps of the existing gap with the leader, find that the identity of the winner depends on the distance between the state of each firm and the finishing line of the race.
A setting closer to ours is one in which firms race for a sequence of innovations. Beath et al. (1994) consider both the case in which the follower can compete for the "state of the art technology" (they call this setting a leapfrog technology) and the case in which each firm has to discover every technology step by step (they call this case a catch-up technology).
By running stochastic simulations they observe, for a Bertrand duopoly, the emergence of persistent dominance both under catch-up and leapfrog technology.
The question of whether asymmetries between firms tend to increase or decrease during a multiple stage race has been addressed by Budd et al. (1993) . In their analysis firm profit flows depend on the gap between their technology levels and effort rates are functions of the level of technological asymmetry. The solution concept employed for the analysis of the resulting dynamic stochastic game is a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies.
A second strand of literature emphasizes the demand side of the innovative activity. Strategic models of adoption focus on the timing of adoption of an innovation which is otherwise available to all firms in the industry. For a survey of the literature on the timing of adoption in a strategic context see Reinganum (1989) ; for more recent contributions which use the Markov perfect equilibrium concept see Kapur (1995a Kapur ( , 1995b .
In this article we focus on adoption of cost reducing technologies instead than on invention. In this we follow Jovanovic (1997) who emphasized that considering learning-based adoption costs, schooling and on-the-job training, and applied R&D spending as total adoption costs, these "amount to at least 10-15% of U.S. output....
[A]doption costs outweigh invention costs roughly 20 or 30 to 1. In LDCs the ratio must be astronomical" (1997: p. 332).
THE MODEL
We introduce a specification of the demand and technology conditions that we will maintain throughout the article. * Time t is discrete. * There is an isoelastic demand function
where Pt is the price of one unit of the industry's homogeneous good at time t, y > 0, is the elasticity of demand, and A is a parameter representing market size.
* The evolution of a cost reducing technology is described by the deterministic process Ct f --wif a firm has adopted at t -1 where r is the number of periods in which adoption occurred. In this last case technological and chronological clocks are following different timings. Given the description of the evolution of the technology, in equilibrium there is either one firm adopting the new innovation or adoption has stopped forever. Any discount factor less than one will indeed make the simultaneous postponing of future adoptions, with no change of technology occurring, meaningless.
The characterization of the equilibrium conditions for a date to be an "absorbing technological state" where adoption stops forever and the two clocks start diverging are analyzed in the following sections. In the next proposition we consider the necessary and sufficient conditions for different period strategy combinations to be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game described by the payoff matrix (3). given that B has last adopted at time t -k -1, and
*
given that A has last adopted at time t -1. 8When status quo is an equilibrium the technological clock stops. The moment in which such equilibrium is reached we should therefore substitute r for t in expression (6).
Moreover it is easy to see that, under myopic behavior, if y = 1, the three equilibrium regions specified by (4), (5), and (6) change in time following the evolution of the latest adopted technology, ct. More precisely if y < 1 and there is adoption from any firm, both the region with multiple equilibria, Ql, and the region where leapfrogging is the unique equilibrium, Q2 , shrink toward zero. Eventually, given constant adoption costs q, the status quo equilibrium will prevail and technological progress halts. If y > 1 and there is adoption, the boundaries between (4) and (5) and (6) all shift to the right. This means that if at time t a given adoption cost falls within the leapfrogging region there will be a time in which the same cost will fall into the multiple equilibria region. If otherwise the adoption cost is too high and falls within the status quo region, there is no technological growth and the equilibrium will remain unchanged as there is no technological growth without adoption.
Equilibria with Discounting. In the following we analyze sequences of adoption decisions in a Bertrand duopoly where firms have a positive discount rate 8.
Starting from period t = 0 each firm selects an infinite sequence of adoption decisions for all the future dates and states of the payoff relevant variables. At any time, t, the action set of a firm is, as before, wi , E {0, 1} and the previous history of play, the history of previous adoptions, defines the value of a state variable specifying the two current cost levels of firms A and B, CA and CB, defined by the last adoptions for each firm. The available new cost reducing technology, ct+,, is given by the past adoption history as specified in (2 10 There may of course be other equilibria of irregular periodicity which we do not characterize here.
Notice that: * Our strategy profile specifies that if there are symmetric initial conditions firm A makes the first move. The parameters of the model (setting t* to be even or odd) determine which player moves last. * ct is an absorbing technological level after which adoption stops and asymmetry is preserved.
* Whether t* < oc or t* = oc depends on the limit behavior of the period profits of the adopting firm associated to the strategy profile (7) as t tends to infinity and, as the next lemma shows, this critical property is dependent upon the elasticity of demand. In the following we define the set of adoption costs and discount rates such that, starting from initial symmetric cost conditions, the two duopolists will keep on leapfrogging each other by following the alternating adoption strategy profile. We consider the two cases when the demand elasticity is greater than or equal to one, and when it is between zero and one. As we have seen in Lemma 1 the stage game profits associated to alternating adoptions have different asymptotic behavior in these two cases and therefore the equilibrium requirements will also differ. PROPOSITION 2. If y > 1, the strategy profile of alternating adoptions, Lt., with t* = oc, defined in (7) Lemma 1 showed that if the elasticity of demand is between zero and one, stage period profits tend to zero under the alternating adoption strategy profile. This implies that adoption will not go on forever. To study the conditions under which a finite number of alternating adoptions is an equilibrium of the infinite horizon game we need to start by the characterization of the state/date where adoption stops.
Suppose we are in a state, sA_, where firm A has lower unit costs than firm B. We define absorbing asymmetry as a strategy profile for the subgame starting at state Two points are worth noticing: first in deriving the necessary and sufficient cost condition for a state of asymmetry to be absorbing'l we find that only the follower's deviation matters and, second, the amount of the previously cumulated difference expressed by k does not play any role in the equilibrium condition. This is explained by the fact that the profit for the follower is zero given the Bertrand structure, irrespective of the number of periods it has been lagging behind, expressed by k.
We are finally ready to study the conditions under which a strategy profile of alternating adoptions is an equilibrium when 0 < y < 1. In this case we have seen that there is a finite number of adoptions followed by absorbing asymmetry. In the following lemma we characterize the date t* from which adoption stops. such that for any t > t* nobody adopts if the history of the game up to t* has been generated by the strategy profile of alternating adoption, Lt*, defined by (7).
In the next proposition we find a sufficient condition for alternating adoptions to be an MPE when 0 < y < 1. By comparing the equilibrium regions for alternating adoptions up to a finite date, as defined in Propositions 4, and for increasing asymmetry, as seen in Proposition 5, it is easy to see13 that, when 0 < y < 1, the two equilibria may coexist and when increasing asymmetry is an equilibrium alternating adoption is an equilibrium too.
The intuition of this result can be extended for more general downward sloping demand functions. The profit's increment for an adopting firm when the other is not adopting is indeed given by the product of two components:
* the difference, due to adoption, in the equilibrium price-cost margin, which under Bertrand competition, is the same, (ct -ct+1), if the adopter is the present leader or follower, and * the quantity demanded at the new equilibrium price. This last quantity is always larger if the follower is the adopter. The adopting follower, when becoming the new leader, will indeed charge a price equal to the unit cost of the previous leader, while the adopting leader will charge a price equal to the, unchanged, unit cost of the follower. By definition the leader has a lower unit cost, so that the previous period follower will charge a lower price and have, through a demand effect, a higher incentive to adopt the new technology.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyzed firm adoption decisions about an infinite sequence of innovations. In a Bertrand duopoly with myopic firms we characterized the cost regions leading to forging ahead, leapfrogging, and status quo. For low adoption costs both forging ahead and leapfrogging are equilibria, for intermediate costs leapfrogging is the unique equilibrium, and for higher costs status quo is the only equilibrium. These equilibrium regions change with the evolution of the cost reducing technology if the elasticity of the market demand is not equal to one. When the elasticity is below one both the forging ahead and the leapfrogging equilibria disappear and technological adoption stops, while if the demand elasticity is greater than one, adoption, once started, will never stop.
With discounting we analyzed the conditions under which a strategy profile of alternating adoptions, inducing perpetual leapfrogging, is sustainable as a Markov perfect equilibrium. Two cases again arise: when the demand elasticity is greater than or equal to one, an alternating adoption strategy profile can go on forever.
When the demand elasticity is below one, alternating adoptions stop at an endogenously derived terminal date and the last adopter remains the leader in the industry.
Finally we considered a strategy of increasing asymmetry in which the leader adopts for a finite number of periods and the follower does not. When the elasticity of the demand is less than one we have that the maximum cumulated asymmetry is bounded above by the inverse of the demand elasticity, while if the demand elasticity is greater than one increasing asymmetry is never a Markov perfect equilibrium.
In conclusion when considering an infinite sequence of adoption decisions, the resulting technological dynamics is determined by the interaction of demand factors (both the elasticity and the size of the market), adoption costs, pace of technical progress, and the discount rate. When, given these parameters, there are incentives to adopt we might expect the challenger/follower firms to account for the majority of the innovative activity.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.
These are just the Nash equilibria of the game described by the matrix (3).
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. This is obvious by taking the limit of the increments in period profits in expression (8).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. We prove Markov perfection in two steps: first we characterize, in Lemma A.1, the necessary and sufficient conditions for an alternating adoptions strategy profile, L,., as defined in (7) to be a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies for the subgames starting from any given state of technological asymmetry, when y > 1, and then we show that if Lt, is a Nash equilibrium from the origin of the game then it is an equilibrium starting from any other subgame. In the same state sA-k the value that firm B derives from sticking to the strategy given that firm A is following the same strategy is (20) we can see that if the condition for Lt, to be a Nash equilibrium is met at so 0 then it is met at sB_ and s_, V t and V k < t. This is because the upper bound of the cost region Qf (t) is increasing in t.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. The continuity of the alternating adoption region for /3 = 0 is clear by comparing the expression of the myopic leapfrogging equilibrium region in (5) and the limit for 8 --0 of (20).
To see the increasing relation between /3 and the region of adoption costs for which Lt, is an equilibrium we note that the partial derivative of (20) By taking the first difference of (31) one obtains Bs incentive of adopting the (n + l)th innovation after having adopted the previous n: We are now ready to prove Proposition 3. We have seen before that a strategy profile of absorbing asymmetry is a Nash equilibrium from any state sAt if and only if condition (30) is satisfied.
If 0 < y < 1 such a strategy profile remains an equilibrium also for any subgame starting from any possible payoff relevant history, i.e., after any number of deviations, adoptions, of the leader, which from (10) define the only payoff relevant technology level. This is because if 0 < y < 1 the adoption cost region, QAA(t), is increasing in the number of deviations of the leader. Suppose for example that the leader deviated r times from the equilibrium path of absorbing asymmetry starting from state s_A t , t-k, and we are in the subgame starting from the out of equilibrium state: implies that firm B has no incentive to deviate from the absorbing asymmetry strategy profile for the subgame starting at t t-kif it had no incentive to deviate from the strategy profile in state sA_. If the strategy profile of absorbing asymmetry is a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies starting from any possible subgame of the game starting at sAtk, then it is a Markov perfect equilibrium from the entire game starting at sA, t-k PROOF OF LEMMA 2. We have seen before that when 0 < y < 1 period profits for the adopter, along a history generated by alternating adoptions, converge to zero. This implies that, given a constant adoption cost, q, we can find a date t* from which time onward adoption is no longer profitable.
Intertemporal profits when adopting at time t for the last time in the game after a history of alternating adoption (t = t* -1), and with a non adopting opponent are given by ( This strategy profile implies alternating adoptions for t < t* and absorbing asymmetry thereafter. The remaining leader would be the firm which was the latest adopter. The identity of this firm depends on whether t* is an even or an odd number.
Incentives to deviate at time t*
We have seen in (30) the necessary and sufficient conditions for a given state st -k to be a state of absorbing asymmetry. If the absorbing asymmetry state has been reached after an alternating adoption strategy profile we know that for A to have adopted at time t* -1 and for B not to adopt at time t* it must be that When firm A is in any state sA = {CA < CB and ct+1 > ct*}, in which the strategy dictates not to adopt because A has lower costs, by sticking to the alternating adoption strategy firm A makes zero period profits and then goes to a new state in which it will adopt (because B has adopted now reverting the cost leadership). Again, by deviating in this stage and adopting, firm A makes negative period profits and reaches a state in which it would adopt under the candidate equilibrium strategy, as this deviation history gives the two firms the same cost conditions. This implies that firm A has no incentive to unilateral deviation at any state for t < t*.
Firm B
Firm Bs possible deviations are more interesting because by nondeviating B makes zero profits from time t* -1 onward. Deviating at t* is too late; we have seen before that at t* the follower has no incentive to deviate because we are in a state of absorbing asymmetry. We want to see if, by deviating before t*, B is able to reverse the sequencing of adoptions so that it becomes the leader and dominates the industry forever.
By backward induction when t* is even firm A adopts at t*-1 and B does not deviate because it will face adoption costs plus zero profits forever.
At t* -2, and in any other state in which B is supposed to adopt, by deviating B is only postponing profits, so it will not deviate.
At t* -3, B is supposed not to adopt and the value of sticking to the strategy profile is If B deviates at t* -3 when it is not supposed to adopt it first pays -q and then obtains zero period profit, because it has adopted together with A. Now, at time t* -2, we are in a state where A adopts because both firms have the same cost level. We have now two conditions on the lower bound for q, and we need to compare which one is more stringent between the lower bound of (36) required for having firm A adopting ct* and (40) required for the follower not to deviate from the equilibrium path before t*. It is possible to show16 that for y< 1 if By comparing condition (49) with condition (46) for state so we can see that the upper bound of (46) is more stringent than the upper bound of (49) and the lower bound of (49) is more stringent than the lower bound of (46). This implies that the condition for nondeviating from the strategy profile of increasing asymmetry for firm A from any subgame starting from any possible history of the game is given by This interval is not empty if and only if yk < 1 and given that k < i* we need i* < 1/y. While firm A is adopting, firm B, by deviating, would only make negative profits before reverting to the candidate equilibrium strategy.
The only interesting deviation for firm B occurs when firm A stops adopting at time i*. Therefore for the strategy Fi* defined in (14) to be an MPE we want the follower, firm B, not to have incentives to deviate and not to adopt the new technology ci*+l, once the leader has last adopted technology ci*.
This condition has already been derived in the section on absorbing asymmetry and it is given by condition (30).
In 
